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RESTRICTION OF BUILDING PERMITS
AS A MEANS FOR CONTROLLING
THE RATE OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
More than ever before, municipalities on the urban fringe are
challenged by the problems of their own growth. Along with the ac-
companying demand of the suburban population for public services,
over-rapid growth threatens to overcome the community tax base.
Many communities are attempting to control the suburban explosion
by the enactment of timing regulations designed to slow expansion
down to a reasonable rate. Other communities may desire timing con-
trols for other reasons which are not so legitimate. While it is true
that a reasonable control on the rate of growth may asssist in the
proper expansion of schools and other facilities, it is also true that
suburbs may use timing controls to keep out large-scale builders be-
cause their developments place a heavy demand on local services,
because they attract a lower economic class, or because of a variety
of other reasons that are suspect. Whether their purposes are benign
or otherwise, a growing number of municipalities are seeking effective
legal means to delay or obstruct large-scale residential development.
So far, a variety of techniques has been tried. Some of these have
gained judicial acceptance, others have not; and a great many are so
new that their legality remains unproven.' It is the purpose of this
comment to examine the judicial reaction to one of these timing
techniques-restrictions on the issuance of building permits.2
Following a local election which focused on the problem of rapid
growth, the New Jersey township of Marlboro passed an amendment
to the Township Building Code designed to slow down new residential
development. The ordinance limited the number of building permits
made available to a developer during certain stages of construction.
A developer was allowed a maximum of ten initial permits. A second
ten could only be issued upon the completion of the first ten building
1. Cutler, Legal and Illegal Methods for Controlling Community Growth on
the Urban Fringe, 1961 Wis. L. Rav. 370 (1961).
2. This comment is limited to methods of restricting building permits by a
quantitative quota and does not include restrictions which impose a large fee for
building permits or restrictions which impose a temporary moratorium on the
issuance of building permits. See Cutler, supra note 1, at 393-94.
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foundations. Ten more permits could be issued only when the first
ten houses were framed and the second ten building foundations were
completed, through a four-step construction cycle covering forty
dwellings at a time. In U.S. Home and Development Corp. v. La-
Mura, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, held this
regulation to be arbitrary, unreasonable, and void as beyond the
statutory power of the municipality.
Prior to the decision in LaMura, the leading decision on building
permit regulation as a timing device was Albrecht Realty Co. v. Town
of New Castle.' In Albrecht, the town of New Castle, New York,
adopted an ordinance providing that no more than 112 residential
permits a year were to be issued for any land that the town board
declared to be within a special residence district authorized by the
ordinance. Thereafter, the town board issued a declaration placing
practically all the residential land in the town in such a special resi-
dence district. As in LaMura, the ordinance was said to be not only
unreasonable, but outside the municipality's authority:
There is nothing in . . . [the enabling act] that gives the defen-
dant town power to regulate the rate of its own growth [sic] and
the Zoning Ordinance Article under attack here is a direct regula-
tion and nothing more.5
If this strong language of the New York trial court is to be taken as
a flat denunciation of all attempts of New York municipalities to
control the rate of their own growth, it has been repudiated by judicial
approval of at least one other New York timing technique. In the
case of Josephs v. Town Board,6 the town of Clarkstown, New York,
linked timing controls to the gradual rezoning of designated areas
from low density use to higher density use. A residential district was
zoned for 40,000 square foot lots, making it undesirable for large-scale
development. The ordinance further provided that exceptions might
be permitted for 22,500 square foot lots provided the town board
found, after a study, that the existing or proposed plans for schools
and other community facilities were adequate for the needs of the
future residents of a proposed development. A New York trial court,
apparently willing to assume the validity of the one-acre zone on which
the regulation was based, held that the town board did not act arbi-
3. 89 N.J. Super. 254, 214 A.2d 538 (App. Div. 1965).
4. 8 Misc. 2d 255, 167 N.Y.S.2d 843 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
5. Id. at 256, 167 N.Y.S.2d at 844.
6. 24 Misc. 2d 366, 198 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
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trarily or capriciously in denying the plaintiff developer a special per-
mit for smaller lot size requirements. The board had examined
school facilities and found that they were inadequate to provide for
the needs of future residents in the proposed development.
At the time of LaMura there was no express authority in the New
Jersey statutes for slowing down the rate of residential construction.7
However, an expansive view of the New Jersey Zoning Act s would
appear to encompass the building permit regulation. The power to
regulate the rate of residential construction could be implied from the
municipal power to "regulate ... buildings and structures according
to their construction"9 or to "regulate... the density of population."10
Furthermore, it would seem that the restriction on building permits
would implement the purposes of avoiding an "undue concentration of
population"' and, perhaps, of preventing the "overcrowding of...
buildings,"12 if it is possible to take into account the effect an un-
restricted influx of new residents would have on school buildings. The
New Jersey court's failure to draw such implications from the statute
suggests the necessity of drafting timing controls so that they are tied
more directly into the stated objectives of zoning in the enabling
law.
The New York zoning laws13 applicable to the Albrecht and Josephs
cases are similar to those of New Jersey, wth the significant addition
of a provision which directs municipalities to "facilitate the adequate
provision of . . . schools."' 4 This provision would appear to be a
likely statutory basis for a timing control, in that the control could
regulate school absorption capacity. The school facilitation provision
was mentioned in both the Albrecht and the Josephs opinions. In
Albrecht, after declaring that the building permit restriction was with-
out statutory authority, the court continued:
If [the zoning act] vested that power in the defendant town, it
would still be required.., to make that regulation "in accordance
7. In 1967 New Jersey enacted the Municipal Planned Unit Development
Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:55-54 to -67 (1967), which sets forth a method for
timing the sequence of residential and non-residential uses.
8. Id. at §§ 40:55-30 to -53.
9. Id. at § 40:55-30.
10. Id.
11. Id. at § 40:55-32.
12. Id.
13. N.Y. TowN LAW §§ 261-84 (McKinney 1965).
14. Id. at § 263.
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with a comprehensive plan . . . to facilitate the adequate pro-
vision . . . of schools," and there is nothing in the record to
suggest that the article was drawn in accordance with any plan
to facilitate the adequate provision of schools, much less any com-
prehensive plan.' 5
In separating the school provision from the statutory authority ques-
tion the court suggests that school facilitation is a secondary statutory
requirement and, as such, could not be a sufficient basis for a timing
regulation in itself. Courts may well be reluctant to face the school
facilitation provision directly. If a municipality is permitted to regu-
late development in accordance with the capacity of its schools, there
is the danger that the municipality might slow down its school con-
struction rate in order to give the planning board leverage over build-
ers. It would be very difficult for a court to supervise or determine
what is a "fair" school construction program if asked to do so directly.
The New York court in Josephs avoided the issue, but perhaps it
was aided there by the fact that the issue was the change in minimum
lot size and crowding was only a standard for determining when the
changes were to be made.
The fact that the timing control in Josephs was couched in terms of
such traditional zoning restrictions as density and lot size requirements
is critical. As timing controls are new to the courts, they will most
likely be reluctant to approve methods like those in LaMura and
Albrecht which are obviously direct controls on business production.
Business production is curtailed in Josephs also, but it is done in-
directly as the restrictions are primarily directed toward the land in-
volved and not the developers. The court in Josephs was apparently
willing to assume the validity of these controls:
No one would now seriously doubt the right of the Town Board
to regulate the density of population in special districts by pro-
visions as are contained in the ordinance here restricting the prop-
erty in the particular District to detached single-family residences
and limiting the lot area for each residence.-
Thus, the Josephs decision indicates that because density require-
ments and minimum lot sizes have long been approved methods of
exercising municipal zoning power, courts may be willing to uphold
ordinances in which they are employed even if the ultimate intent
of such measures is recognized to be developmental timing.
15. 8 Misc. 2d at 256, 167 N.Y.S.2d at 844-45.
16. 24 Misc. 2d at 368, 198 N.Y.S.2d at 698-99.
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The courts in LaMura and Albrecht were highly critical of the eco-
nomic effect the ordinances would have on the developers. In LaMura
the court said that "the ten units at a time" restriction was a "dras-
tic... impingement on the right of a developer to build homes in
accordance with his economic capacity and business exigencies.""I
In Albrecht the annual limitation on building permits was attacked
in this way:
Were [the ordinance] within the terms of the power granted to
the defendant town ... it would still be unreasonable because to
whatever extent it was effective it would deprive the plaintiffs here
of all beneficial use of their land and would make it impossible for
them to make a reasonable return on their investment.' 8
This argument has been criticized in that the regulation in Albrecht,
as in LaMura, does not permanently preclude the use of property from
"all beneficial uses," but merely delays its development for certain
purposes.1 9 Furthermore, it has long been the rule that a mere lessen-
ing of a developer's profits or even economic loss does not necessarily
render a zoning ordinance unreasonable.20 However, if the develop-
er's economic loss is to play any role in timing cases, it should apply
to the method used in Josephs as well as to the building permit or-
dinances. Density controls also have the effect of slowing down con-
struction because low density, more expensive housing moves more
slowly into the market than high density, less expensive housing.21
The fact that density controls have been widely accepted by the courts
should further indicate that deferred profits do not alone make a
timing control unconstitutional.
The unreasonableness of the LaMura ordinance went beyond profit
deferment. It would have fostered economic waste. The court points
out that:
The whole concept of large scale development contemplates the
incidence of mass development of residential areas where builders
may well be commencing construction of more than ten units at a
time and where it may be necessary to do so as a matter of effi-
ciency.q 2
17. 89 N.J. Super. at 264, 214 A.2d at 543.
18. 8 Misc. 2d at 256, 167 N.Y.S.2d at 845.
19. Note, The Legal Significance of Cost Considerations in the Regulation of
Apartments by Suburbs, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 413, 431 & n.100 (1964).
20. See Wulfsohn v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 288, 150 N.E. 120 (1925).
21. See Christine Building Co. v. City of Troy, 367 Mich. 508, 116 N.W.2d
816 (1962).
22. 89 N.J. Super. at 264, 214 A.2d at 543.
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It is apparent that normal construction practice would be disrupted
as delays and extra costs would unavoidably result from such a scheme.
Even though the Albrecht ordinance did allow the permitted con-
struction to proceed at a normal rate, it is not an attractive alterna-
tive. Unlike LaMura, it put an absolute limit on the number of per-
mits available in any one year. Perhaps the Albrecht ordinance is
more objectionable because it offered no guidelines for determining
which developers should receive the limited number of building per-
mits. A discretionary system such as this obviously opens the way to
abuses.
The ordinance in Josephs is undoubtedly more sophisticated than
either of the building permit ordinances. Standards are provided by
basing the density change on school capacity, a procedure which may
still be self-serving. Yet there is a further problem with the Josephs
ordinance, which is perhaps unique to it. The shift of a low density
area to a higher density might well create discordances in development
because the density change is related to school capacity and not to de-
velopment patterns.
In conclusion, it is dear that if a building permit restriction is ever
to gain judicial approval, it will have to be designed with a good deal
more attention to the zoning statutes and the reasonableness of its
operation in relation to the public need for a timing control than
was the case in LaMura or Albrecht. In fact, legislative amendment
of the zoning act may well be necessary in order to assure validity.
However, there is some doubt whether the Josephs ordinance should
entirely escape invalidity, especially in light of its potentiality for
misuse. Yet as long as zoning remains the prerogative of autonomous,
suburban municipal governments, the potentiality for abuse in timing
controls over new development will always exist.
H. William Allen, III
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